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5Variability in Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
by
THEODORE EISENBERG, MICHAEL HEISE, AND MARTIN T. WELLS∗
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker acknowledged that empirical studies undercut criti-
cism of punitive damages. Paradoxically, the Court simultaneously expressed
concern about jury predictability based on a high and variable punitive–compen-
satory ratio published in an article by the present authors. The Court reduced the
$2.5 billion Exxon Valdez punitive award to $500 million and stated: “the con-
stitutional outer limit may well be 1:1.”1Our empirical findings do not support
the unpredictability concern or widely applying the limiting ratio. The high and
variable ratio is an artifact of not accounting for the key variable that explains
punitive awards – the compensatory award. (JEL: K 00, K 13, K 32, K 41)
1 Introduction
Punitive damages are one of the flashpoints of United States (U.S.) tort law and
a source of tension in international civil justice relations (GOTANDA [2007], QUARTA
[2008]). In addition to the substantive policy debate about whether punitive damages
should exist, debate exists about the quantitative pattern of punitive awards. After
decades of misinformation about the U.S. legal system fostered by groups such as
the American Tort Reform Association (AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION
(ATRA) [2009]),2 it is now generally accepted that the mass of punitive damages
∗ Eisenberg (corresponding author) is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Ad-
junct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University; Heise is Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School; Wells is Charles A. Alexander Professor of Statistical Sciences,
Cornell University, Professor of Clinical Epidemiology and Health Services Research,
Cornell University Weill Medical College, and Elected Member of the Faculty, Cornell
Law School. Earlier versions of the results reported here were presented at the South-
eastern Association of Law Schools Meeting, Palm Beach, 2008, at the ABA Ameri-
can Jury Trial Commission Symposium, Fordham Law School, 2008, and at a faculty
seminar at Tel Aviv University School of Law, 2009.
1 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2634, n. 28 (2008).
2 ATRA [2009] states, “Reform is urgently needed to restore balance, fairness, and
predictability to punitive damages law. The civil justice system should not be a ‘litiga-
tion lottery’ characterized by excessiveness and arbitrariness.” ATRA cites none of the
best-available information on patterns of punitive damages awards.
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awards have been reasonably sober, modest in size, and without significant increases
over time.
For example, no credible debate exists about whether, in the mass of cases, a strong
association exists between punitive and compensatory awards (e.g., EISENBERG AND
WELLS [2006]). To our knowledge, no persuasive analysis of actual cases supports
the absence of a relation between punitive and compensatory damages (e.g., VIDMAR
et al. [2006]). It was claimed in HERSCH AND VISCUSI [2004] that no significant
relation exists between punitive and compensatory awards in very large cases, but
that claim is incorrect (EISENBERG AND WELLS [2006]). It was also claimed in
HERSCH AND VISCUSI [2009] that jury punitive damages behavior is unpredictable.
The claim seems based on Exxon-funded experiments that never reconciled their
findings with real-world punitive damages data (EISENBERG, RACHLINSKI, AND
WELLS [2002]). SUNSTEIN AND SHIH [2004] have incorrectly claimed no significant
association between punitive and compensatory awards in sexual harassment cases
(SHARKEY [2006]).
Roughly speaking, U.S. juries and judges have let “the punishment fit the crime.”
Greater harm, as measured by the level of compensatory damages, has been ac-
companied by increased awards of punitive damages. The relation between punitive
and compensatory damages has been strikingly consistent across many data sets
(VIDMAR et al. [2006], HYMAN et al. [2007, p. 25], KARPOFF AND LOTT JR. [1999,
p. 543], MOLLER, PACE, AND CARROLL [1999, p. 300, n. 52], SCHLANGER [2003,
p. 1605 and n. 136], SHARKEY [2006]). In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (128 S.Ct.
2605, 2624 (2008)) the Supreme Court observed that recent studies undercut the
most audible criticism of punitive damages and that discretion to award punitive
damages has not produced a mass of runaway awards. Although the Supreme Court
has now recognized that much of the criticism of punitive damages awards has been
misplaced, the Court has nevertheless regarded the punitive–compensatory relation
as sufficiently important to expand the constitutional doctrine of substantive due
process to restrict punitive damages (CALABRESI [2008]).
The Court’s potentially most important quantitative ruling with respect to punitive
damages came not as a matter of constitutional doctrine, but in the exercise of the
Court’s authority over federal maritime law. The Court’s ruling grew out of the
massive oil spill from the Exxon Valdez oil tanker in 1989. In Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker (henceforth Exxon Shipping), the same case in which the Court recognized
the general sobriety of punitive awards, the Court expressed concern about what it
perceived to be a high mean and standard deviation in the punitive–compensatory
ratio. Although Exxon Shipping was a maritime case, its pronouncements have
implications for a wider range of punitive damages cases,3 and the Court stated in
3 Compare, e.g., Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., 305 Fed. Appx. 13, 27 n. 15
(3d Cir. 2008); Gragg v. International Management Group (UK), Inc. 2009 WL
1140490, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 4/24/2009); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d
429, 483 n. 46 (W.D. Pa. 2008); Lithia Motors, Inc. v. Yovan, 204 P.3d 120, 128
(Or. App. 2009), with Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 54
Variability in Punitive Damages(2010) 7
footnote that “the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1” (Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2634, n. 28 (2008)).
Some of the present authors were among those who wrote the article reporting
the mean and standard deviation of the punitive–compensatory ratio relied on in
Exxon Shipping to refer to a possible 1:1 constitutional limit on the ratio. Since the
Court relied on our research results to announce potentially important new doctrine,
it is appropriate for us to comment on the Court’s interpretation of that research.
The main limitation in the Court’s analysis was not accounting for the variability
of the punitive–compensatory ratio as a function of the level of the compensatory
award. Basing doctrine on a single mean and standard deviation is not statistically
supportable because, as the Court has recognized, the means and standard deviations
for low compensatory award cases are, and should be, noticeably higher than these
statistics for high compensatory award cases. Basing doctrine on the combined mean
and standard deviation ignores the expected and desirable heterogeneity across low
and high award cases.
Section 2 of this article reviews the facts of the Exxon Shipping case and describes
the Court’s reliance on our data to support its concern about punitive awards.
Section 3 presents our statistical analysis suggesting that the data do not support
broad application of the Court’s 1:1 limit. Such a limit might have been reasonable on
the facts of Exxon Shipping but would not be a statistically supportable constitutional
or prudential principle. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Exxon Shipping Case and the Court’s Concern about
Varying Punitive Awards
2.1 Facts and Rulings Relating to the Punitive Damages Award
In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on a reef off the Alaskan coast,
fracturing its hull and spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound.
Exxon Shipping Co., owner of the supertanker, and its corporate parent, Exxon
Mobil Corp. (collectively, Exxon), settled state and federal claims for environmental
damage, with payments exceeding $1 billion. A separate action was brought for
economic losses to individuals who depended on Prince William Sound for their
livelihoods (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2611 (2008)).4
On the night of the spill, Joseph Hazelwood captained the 900 foot-long tanker
loaded with over a million barrels of crude oil. While employed by Exxon, Captain
Hazelwood had completed a four-week alcohol treatment program but failed to
complete a prescribed follow-up program and stopped attending Alcoholics Anony-
mous. Plaintiffs presented evidence that after treatment Hazelwood “drank in bars,
n. 14 (1st Cir. 2009); Line v. Ventura, 2009 WL 1425993, at *11 (Ala. 5/22/2009);
American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F.Supp.2d 841, 859 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
4 The description of the facts in Exxon Shipping is taken largely from the Supreme
Court’s opinion in the case.
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parking lots, apartments, airports, airplanes, restaurants, hotels, at various ports, and
aboard Exxon tankers” (p. 2612, quoting district court). With respect the Exxon’s
knowledge of Hazelwood’s drinking behavior, contested testimony indicated that
Hazelwood drank with Exxon officials and that Exxon managers knew of his re-
lapse. Witnesses testified that on the night of the spill, “Hazelwood downed at least
five double vodkas in the waterfront bars of Valdez, an intake of about 15 ounces of
80-proof alcohol, enough ‘that a non-alcoholic would have passed out’ ” (p. 2612,
quoting Court of Appeals).
On that night, about two hours after sailing, the ship, under Hazelwood’s active
control, made a standard maneuver out of the shipping lane to avoid icy conditions.
The turn required a turn back to the shipping lane to avoid an underwater reef. The
Supreme Court’s opinion described the critical events that followed:
“Two minutes before the required turn, however, Hazelwood left the bridge and went down
to his cabin in order, he said, to do paperwork. This decision was inexplicable. There was
expert testimony that, even if their presence is not strictly necessary, captains simply do not
quit the bridge during maneuvers like this, and no paperwork could have justified it. And in
fact the evidence was that Hazelwood’s presence was required, both because there should
have been two officers on the bridge at all times and his departure left only one, and because
he was the only person on the entire ship licensed to navigate this part of Prince William
Sound. To make matters worse, before going below Hazelwood put the tanker on autopilot,
speeding it up, making the turn trickier, and any mistake harder to correct.” (p. 2612)
Those left on the bridge inexplicably failed to make the required turn back into
the shipping lane and the ship hit the reef, tearing the hull open, and leading to 11
million gallons of oil leaking into Prince William Sound.5 After Hazelwood returned
to the bridge, he tried but failed to rock the ship off the reef, a maneuver which
could have increased the spill.
Evidence suggested that the effects of Hazelwood’s pre-voyage drinking had not
worn off by the time the ship ran aground. The Supreme Court’s opinion states:
“The Coast Guard’s nearly immediate response included a blood test of Hazelwood (the
validity of which Exxon disputes) showing a blood-alcohol level of .061 eleven hours after
the spill. [...] Experts testified that to have this much alcohol in his bloodstream so long
after the accident, Hazelwood at the time of the spill must have had a blood-alcohol level
of around .241, [...] three times the legal limit for driving in most States.” (p. 2613)
After the spill, Exxon spent around $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts. The U.S.
charged Exxon with criminal violations of federal laws and Exxon pleaded guilty to
violating the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
and agreed to pay a $150 million fine, later reduced to $25 million plus restitution
of $100 million. A civil action by the U.S. and the State of Alaska for environmental
5 It has been reported that, “If the Exxon Valdez spill had happened on the East
Coast, it would have extended from Massachusetts to North Carolina” (WARREN
[2009]).
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harms ended with a consent decree for Exxon to pay at least $900 million toward
restoring natural resources, and Exxon paid another $303 million in voluntary
settlements with fishermen, property owners, and other private parties. As measured
by the amounts paid, the harm found to have been caused by Exxon likely exceeded
$3 billion.
The remaining civil cases were consolidated into the case that wound up before the
Supreme Court and included as plaintiffs commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans,
and landowners. At Exxon’s request, the district court certified a mandatory class of
all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, consisting of over 32,000 plaintiffs. Exxon
stipulated to its negligence and to liability for compensatory damages. Phase I of
the trial considered Exxon and Hazelwood’s potential for punitive damages. This
phase included instructions concerning corporate liability for acts of employees.
Phase II of the trial determined the compensatory damages for commercial fisher-
men and Native Alaskans, and Phase III determined the amount of punitive damages.
Phase IV, which was to set compensation for other plaintiffs, was obviated by set-
tlement (pp. 2613f.).
In Phase II the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to the
commercial fishermen. The district court included damages to other interests in
arriving at a compensatory damages figure of about $500 million, which the Supreme
Court accepted.6 Most of the Native Alaskan class had settled their compensatory
claims for $20 million, and those who opted out of that settlement ultimately settled
for a total of around $2.6 million. In Phase III, the jury heard about Exxon’s
management’s behavior relevant to the spill. The court instructed the jurors that
punitive damages were designed not to provide compensatory relief but to punish
and deter. The court instructed the jury to consider the reprehensibility of Exxon’s
conduct, its financial condition, the magnitude of the harm, and any mitigating facts.
The jury awarded $5 billion against Exxon (p. 2614), a result that, along with the
spill itself, generated much commentary.7
On appeals below the Supreme Court level, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the Phase I jury instruction on corporate liability for acts of manage-
rial agents.8 With respect to the amount of the punitive damages award, the Ninth
Circuit remanded twice for adjustments in light of the Supreme Court’s due process
cases.9 The Ninth Circuit eventually reduced the punitive award to $2.5 billion, the
amount reviewed in the Supreme Court.
Two of the issues reviewed by the Supreme Court are not of immediate interest
for purposes of this article. The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether
maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive damages for the acts of manage-
6 See In re the Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1063 (D. Alaska 2002); 128
S.Ct., p. 2634 (accepting the District Court’s calculation of compensatory damages).
7 See STOLL [1995, pp. 19ff.], BARDWICK [2000], CARTWRIGHT [1991], GALLAG-
HER [1990], GOLDBERG [1994], MILLARD [1993], PANOFF [1998, pp. 723f.], QUAM
[1992], STAGER [1995], TOLBERT [1990], DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE [1991].
8 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d, at 1236.
9 270 F.3d, at 1246f., 472 F.3d 600, 601, 625 (2006), 490 F.3d 1066, 1068 (2007).
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rial agents and whether the Clean Water Act10 precludes punitive damages awards
in maritime spill cases (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 492 (2008)). That
is, we are not concerned here with whether Exxon should have been held liable for
any punitive damages, as the jury determined in Phase I.
Our focus is on the third question that the Court agreed to review, the amount of
punitive damages given the amount of the compensatory award, because this is the
quantitative relation that the Court has stated has constitutional due process limita-
tions. Technically, that issue was not before the Court as a matter of constitutional
law. The Court agreed to review, “whether the punitive damages awarded against
Exxon in this case were excessive as a matter of maritime common law” (Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2615 (2008)). The maritime law context of
the Court’s ruling means that Exxon Shipping Co. is not formally a holding about
constitutional due process limits on punitive damages.
Nevertheless, the case’s application of a limit on punitive damages has implica-
tions beyond the maritime law context. As noted above, the Court stated that the
constitutional outer limit may well be the 1:1 ratio it applied in Exxon Shipping
(p. 2634, n. 28). And the concerns that led the Court to reduce the punitive award
from the $2.5 billion approved by the Ninth Circuit to $500 million are based on
our data that could as easily be applied in a constitutional context. Lower courts
have applied Exxon Shipping in constitutional settings beyond the case’s maritime
context.11
2.2 The Data the Court Relied on in Exxon Shipping
In reducing the punitive damages award, the Court relied on empirical data about the
relation between punitive and compensatory damages. We therefore first describe
the data and the relevant empirical research relied on.
Exxon Shipping relied in part on an article by some of the present authors. The
article, “Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data,” was published in 2006
in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS) (EISENBERG et al. [2006]).12
That article analyzed three major data sets in what is sometimes referred to as the
“Civil Justice Survey of State Courts.” The Civil Justice Survey is a project of
the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) and includes data gathered directly from state court clerks’ offices on tort,
contract, and property cases disposed of by trial in fiscal year 1991–1992, and then
calendar years 1996 and 2001.13 The three separate data sets cover state courts of
general jurisdiction in a random sample of 46 of the 75 most populous counties in
10 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V).
11 See note 4 supra.
12 The description of the data used here is based on the description in that article.
13 The 2005 Civil Justice Survey data included 156 counties (BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS [2008]). The 2005 data become available after the decision in Exxon Ship-
ping, were not included in the Court’s analysis, and therefore are not analyzed here.
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the United States. The 2001 data included 46 counties; the 1991–1992 and 1996
data included 45. One county included in the 1991–1992 and 1996 study, Norfolk,
MA, fell out of the nation’s 75 most populous in the 2000 Census and was replaced
by Mecklenburg County, NC, and El Paso County, TX. Two Maryland counties
declined to participate in the 1991–1992 study, and were replaced with Fairfax
County for all three iterations of the Civil Justice Survey.
The 75 counties sampled include approximately 33% of the 1990 U.S. population;
the actual 45 counties contributing data account for approximately 20% of the
population.14 The initial dataset (1991–1992) includes only jury trials. The two
subsequent data sets, 1996 and 2001, include jury and bench trials, thereby allowing
direct comparisons between judge and jury trials. The three data sets include all
completed trials in all three years in most of the counties. Sampling in the 1992
and 1996 data sets is described in earlier publications. Sampling was used in three
counties in the 2001 data set, Cook County, Illinois, and Philadelphia County and
Bergen County, New Jersey.
These data are the most representative sample of state court trials in the United
States. With direct access to state court clerks’ offices, as well as approximately
100 trained coders recording data, the information gathered does not rely on liti-
gants or third parties to report. Self-reports, common in many commercial verdict
reporters, typically overrepresent cases with large awards. (EISENBERG et al. [1997,
p. 641, n. 53], MERRITT AND BARRY [1999], MOLLER, PACE, AND CARROLL [1999,
p. 335]). The quality of the data made it appropriate for the Court to rely on them
in assessing punitive damages awards and should encourage BJS and the NCSC to
continue this important work.
2.3 The Court’s Concern in Exxon Shipping
Before expressing concern about the pattern of punitive damages awards, the Court
initially noted that the criticism of punitive damages awards has been undercut by
empirical studies.
“American punitive damages have been the target of audible criticism in recent decades [...]
but the most recent studies tend to undercut much of it [...] [D]iscretion to award punitive
damages has not mass-produced runaway awards [...] by most accounts the median ratio
of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1.” (Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2624 (2008))
The Court further noted that periodic claims of punitive damages awards increasing
over time are not supported by the data.
“Nor do the data substantiate a marked increase in the percentage of cases with punitive
awards over the past several decades.” (p. 2624)
14 For summaries of the data and methodology, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS [2004], [1996], and [1995].
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The Court concluded that the figures “show an overall restraint” (p. 2624). In
reaching the conclusion that criticism of punitive damages has exaggerated reality,
the Court relied in part on our statistical analysis of the BJS 1992, 1996, and 2001
data sets (p. 2624, nn. 13–14).
But the Court relied on our data for a finding somewhat at odds with the above
conclusions about the reality of punitive damages awards. Based on the descriptive
statistics reported in Table 1 of our JELS article, reproduced in part as Table 1 below,
the Court noted that the mean ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in the 438
jury trials studied was 2.90 and the standard deviation was 13.81 (p. 2625 and n. 14).
Relying on the mean and standard deviation from our descriptive statistics,
the Court hypothesized that, despite the overall sober pattern of awards, there
was a problem of unpredictability. The Court stated its concern in the opinion’s
text:
“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts of law
are concerned with fairness as consistency, and evidence that the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards falls within a reasonable zone, or that punitive awards are infrequent,
fails to tell us whether the spread between high and low individual awards is acceptable. The
available data suggest it is not. A recent comprehensive study of punitive damages awarded
by juries in state civil trials found a median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards of
just 0.62:1, but a mean ratio of 2.90:1 and a standard deviation of 13.81.” (p. 2625)
The main question we address in this article is whether the Court’s reliance on our
descriptive statistics in the JELS article supports widespread application of a 1:1
ratio.
Briefly, the Court relied on our summary statistics about the mean and standard
deviation of the punitive–compensatory ratio without considering the larger statis-
tical picture. As the article on which the Court relied showed, the most important
statistical influence on the size of the punitive award is the size of the compensatory
award. The summary statistics do not account for the size of the compensatory
award because they were merely summary statistics, intended to inform the reader
about the overall nature of the data. We therefore believe that further discussion of
the data the Court relied on is warranted.
3 A More Detailed Analysis of the Mean and Standard Deviation Relied on
in Exxon Shipping
We begin by reporting information included in Table 1 of the JELS article that
the Supreme Court relied on. In describing our summary statistics for jury trials,
the Court accurately described the mean and standard deviation numbers from our
article. But a more complete reading of the article should have generated hesitancy
in concluding, based on those numbers, that our data supported a pattern of unpre-
dictability in the amount of punitive damages awards. Further insight into the data
was available from two sources in the article: (1) the figures showing the relation
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Table 1
Characteristics of Damages Awards (using the BJS data relied on in Exxon Shipping)
Jury Bench Combined
Number of trials with plaintiff win 9,040 2,570 11,610
Number of trials with punitive damages 438 101 539
Percent of trials with punitive damages 4.85 3.93 4.64
Punitive award mean 3,016,991 461,118 2,557,262
Punitive award median 63,115 45,901 56,401
Punitive award trimmed mean 967,714 58,631 735,832
(excludes highest 1%)
Punitive award trimmed median 58,631 45,732 54,134
Punitive–compensatory ratio if compensatory > 0
mean ratio 2.90 1.60 2.66
median ratio 0.62 0.66 0.62
standard deviation of ratio 13.81 4.54 12.66
Note: Summary statistics for 539 tried cases with punitive damages awards from 46 of the
nation’s most populous counties. The trials terminated in 1991–1992, 1996, and 2001.
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995], EISENBERG et al. [2006].
between punitive and compensatory awards, and (2) the regression analyses reported
in the article that modeled the punitive award as a function of the compensatory
award. Insight was also available from the Court’s own qualitative statements about
the relation between punitive and compensatory damages.
3.1 A More Complete Description of our Report on the Relation between Punitive
and Compensatory Awards
Figures 1 and 2 from the JELS article, reproduced here, each showed aspects of the
relation between the punitive and compensatory award. Figure 1 shows a scatterplot
of punitive and compensatory awards, with points labeled “J” corresponding to jury
trials and points labeled “B” corresponding to bench or judge trials. Figure 2 shows
the same data subdivided by year and mode of trial.
The figures visually suggest a highly explicable pattern between punitive and
compensatory awards. As the compensatory award increases, so does the punitive
award and it does so in a linear fashion in log-transformed dollars. Moreover, the
figures show that the pattern is similar for both judges and juries. If lay juries gener-
ated awards that were too unpredictable, the figures suggest that the juries were no
more unpredictable than professional judges. One’s eye provides the essential linear
relation between punitive and compensatory awards. And more formal regression
Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, and Martin T. Wells14 JITE 166
Figure 1
Judge and Jury Punitive and Compensatory (logs) Damages
Note: Trials indicated by “J” are jury trials; trials indicated by “B” are bench trials. Lines
are the best-fitting linear regression lines for jury and bench trials.
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995], EISENBERG et al.
[2006].
analysis confirms the visual story. Table 4 from the JELS article, reproduced here
as Table 2, reports the regression results for the relation between the punitive and
compensatory award.
As Table 2 shows and the figures visually confirm, the relation between punitive
and compensatory awards is highly statistically significant. Including or excluding
a dummy variable for whether the trial was a judge or trial makes little difference
across the three models reported.
Furthermore, it is not merely the case that a highly statistically significant re-
lation between punitive and compensatory awards exists. The relation is socially
substantial as well. The amount of the variance in the punitive award explained by
the compensatory award is noteworthy. In this sense, the models fit the data well.
The R2s for the models in the penultimate row of Table 2 indicate that above 50%
of the variance in punitive awards is explained by the models. Although R2 can
be misused as a measure of model strength, in simple models in which claims of
unpredictability about data abound, R2 can provide some insight on that question.
In the simplest one-explanatory-variable model (model (1)) in Table 2, R2 is simply
the square of the linear correlation coefficient, a measure of linear association that
ranges from −1 to +1. In model (1), therefore, the correlation coefficient is the
squared root of 0.577, or 0.76. If one restricts the sample to the 438 jury trials,
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Figure 2
Punitive and Compensatory Awards (logs) by Trial Mode and Year
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995], EISENBERG et al.
[2006].
Table 2
Regression Models of Punitive Damages (log) Levels (using the BJS data
relied on in Exxon Shipping)
(1) (2) (3)
Compensatory damages (log) 0.835∗∗ 0.835∗∗ 0.843∗∗
(0.040) (0.038) (0.046)
Jury trial dummy (1 = jury trial) – −0.029 0.009
– (0.026) (0.145)
Jury trial × compensatory damages (log) – – −0.008
– – (0.029)
Constant 0.593∗∗ 0.639∗∗ 0.599∗∗
(0.197) (0.199) (0.236)
Model significance < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
R2 0.577 0.578 0.578
N 539 539 539
Notes: ∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression models for 539 tried
cases with punitive damages awards from 46 of the nation’s most populous counties. The
trials terminated in 1991–1992, 1996, and 2001.
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995], EISENBERG et al. [2006].
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the correlation coefficient is 0.69.15 Correlation coefficients can themselves be mis-
used but when the scatterplots show a strong linear association, as is the case here,
misuse of the correlation coefficient is not a material concern. The high correlation
coefficients are not consistent with the claim that the past pattern of punitive awards
has been highly unpredictable. In social science research, R2s across studies are not
directly comparable, but explaining 50% of the variance can be quite impressive.16
A study of 169 criminal justice articles reporting R2 found an average of 0.389
(standard deviation of 0.220), and a median of 0.365. About one quarter of the art-
icles had an R2 of less than 0.20, and over 70% had an R2 of under 0.50 (WEISBURD
AND PIQUERO [2008]). On the civil justice side, models of compensatory damages
do not regularly achieve the level of explanatory power that the models in Table 2
achieve (EISENBERG et al. [1997, p. 650 and n. 64]).
Figures 1 and 2 from the JELS article have a second feature relevant to the Court’s
concern about unpredictability. Not only do they show regularity in the punitive-
compensatory relation, they show substantially more variation in that relation for low
compensatory awards. The scatterplots in the figures show that for compensatory
awards less than $10,000 (4 on the x-axis in the log 10 units used), there is little
pattern to the punitive–compensatory relation. The imagined best-fitting line for the
low awards appears to be nearly horizontal, with a near-zero slope. This is confirmed
by a regression model of the 54 jury trials with compensatory awards of less than
$10,000. The coefficient for the compensatory damages variable is small (0.093)
and statistically insignificant (p = 0.545). It is also confirmed by a study that fit
a more complex, non-linear line to a larger data set of compensatory and punitive
awards. In that larger model, the best-fitting regression line was a cubic line, with
no significant slope at the low end of compensatory awards (EISENBERG, HANS,
AND WELLS [2008]). So the graphs and regression models in the JELS article that
the Supreme Court relied on both provided information that might have tempered
the Court’s concern about unpredictability based on that article.
Since the Court in Exxon Shipping relied on our summary statistics of the ratio of
punitive and compensatory damages, we present here a figure showing the relation
between the punitive–compensatory ratio that concerned the Court and the level
of the compensatory award. Figure 3 shows a kernel-weighted, smoothed local
polynomial regression of the punitive–compensatory ratio on the compensatory
award (see RUPPERT, WAND, AND CARROLL [2003]). The shaded portion of the
figure shows the 95% confidence band for the regression line.
Figure 3 shows, now in the ratio units that concerned the Court, what the JELS
article figures suggested. The punitive–compensatory ratio/compensatory award
relation has a substantial slope and wide variability at the low end of compensatory
15 The correlation coefficient for jury trials does not vary materially if one limits
the sample to cases with compensatory awards exceeding $10,000 (correlation coeffi-
cient= 0.680).
16
“Values of .02, .13, and .26 have been proposed as potentially useful estimates
of small, medium, and large effect sizes for the population R2” (COHEN et al. [2003,
p. 93]).
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Figure 3
Local Polynomial Regression of the Punitive–Compensatory Ratio
on the Compensatory Award
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995].
awards. The slope levels off in the region of compensatory awards of about $10,000
(“4” on the log 10 scale used for Figure 3’s x-axis) and the confidence band narrows
in that region. From $10,000 to about $1 million in compensatory awards, the ratio
is stable. Above about $1 million the data thin out. Note also that the punitive–
compensatory ratio stabilizes around 1 (“0” on the log scale used for the figure’s
y-axis) or slightly lower as the compensatory award reaches $10,000. So the figure
in the ratio units confirms the results of the figures in the JELS article.
3.2 Why do our Conclusions Differ from the Court’s?
Our revisiting of the figures and regression results from the JELS article relied on
by the Court raises the question of how the mean and standard deviation relied
on by the Court can be consistent with a portrait of punitive damages so different
from the portrait the Court in Exxon Shipping relied on to support the 1:1 punitive–
compensatory ratio it imposed. One answer is that the Court did not appear to believe
it was relying on a different portrait of punitive damages. The Court seemed to agree
with the JELS article’s conclusion that the punitive damages system was not out
of control, as suggested by the Court’s system-wide statements quoted above. But
the Court’s simultaneous reliance on the data to label a segment of punitive awards
as unpredictable seems internally contradictory. How can the same data support
a system sufficiently sober to lead the Court to chastise those claiming a system out
of control and a system warranting the Court’s intervention based on its conclusion
about unpredictability?
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Although we are not privy to the Justices’ thought process, and therefore cannot
fully resolve the opinion’s seeming internal contradiction, we believe we can provide
some statistical insight into why the mean and standard deviation relied on by the
Court do not support its concern about unpredictability. The short answer is that the
detailed analysis in the JELS article more fully accounted for the relation between
punitive and compensatory damages than did the summary statistics in Table 1
that the Court relied on, while seemingly ignoring the rest of the JELS article that
related to this issue. The key additional factor explored throughout the article was
the importance of the level of the compensatory award. To show the importance of
the compensatory award level in assessing the mean and standard deviation relied
on by the Court, Table 3 presents relevant summary statistics for jury cases with
punitive and compensatory damages, but now stratified by the level of compensatory
awards in the JELS article data.
Table 3 suggests that all of the high mean and standard deviation that concerned
the Court comes from cases with compensatory awards of less than $10,000. For
cases with compensatory awards of less than $1,000, the table’s fourth column shows
that the punitive–compensatory ratio standard deviation was 175.44; for cases with
compensatory awards from $1,000 to $9,999, the standard deviation was 39.37. But
the standard deviation dramatically decreased for cases with compensatory awards
of $10,000 or more and did not exceed 3.58 for any group of these compensatory
awards. For cases with larger awards the mean ratio and its standard deviation were
quite stable.
From a statistical perspective one can explore the relation between the standard
deviation across large and small compensatory awards by defining a dummy variable
Table 3
Stratifying the Punitive–Compensatory Ratio in Jury Trials by the Size of the
Compensatory Award (using the BJS data relied on in Exxon Shipping)
Compensatory award Median Mean Punitive– Number of
range punitive– punitive– compensatory cases in
compensatory compensatory ratio standard award range
ratio ratio deviation
$0 to 999 24.69 101.47 175.44 11
$1k to 9,999 1.00 9.64 39.37 43
$10k to 99,999 0.56 1.68 3.58 162
$100k to 999,999 0.55 1.62 3.32 151
$1m to 9,999,999 0.42 1.46 3.71 57
$10m to < $100m 0.57 1.12 1.31 13
$100m or more 2.41 2.41 – 1
Notes: k = $1,000; m = $1 million. All amounts are in dollars inflation adjusted to 2001.
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995].
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Figure 4
Distributions of Punitive–Compensatory Ratio
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the punitive–compensatory ratio for 438 jury tri-
als with punitive and compensatory damages. The left portion of the figure shows the ratio
in untransformed units. The right portion of the figure shows the log of the ratio.
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995].
equal to one if the compensatory award is less than $10,000 and equal to zero if
the compensatory award is greater than or equal to $10,000. One can then test the
hypothesis that the standard deviations for the two groups are the same. Before
conducting such a test, however, it is helpful to inspect the data using Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows a histogram of the punitive–compensatory ratio in untransformed
units and in units in which the ratio has been transformed to logarithms (natural).
The left portion of the figure shows the distribution of the ratio in untransformed
units. The right portion of the figure shows the distribution of the log (natural) of the
ratio. The figure shows that the untransformed ratio does not come close to satisfying
assumptions about normality that underlie many statistical tests. Further exploration
of the untransformed distribution, excluding cases in the extreme right tail, also sug-
gest extreme skewness in the distribution. In contrast, the transformed distribution,
while not perfect, has a reasonably satisfactory appearance and reasonable statistical
attributes.
We conduct statistical tests using both the untransformed and the transformed
ratios and using robust tests of variance. Table 4 reports these results. The two
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Table 4
Tests of the Hypotheses that Mean and Standard Deviation for Cases with Compensatory
Awards Less than $10,000 Equal those for Cases with Compensatory Awards of $10,000
or More (using the BJS data relied on in Exxon Shipping)
Log of Punitive–compensatory ratio
punitive–compensatory ratio (untransformed)
Compensatory award range Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation
$0 to 9,999 0.88 2.10 28.35 91.81
$10,000 or more −0.76∗ 1.90† 1.61∗ 3.44∗
Notes: N for $0 to 9,999 = 54; N for $10,000 or more = 384. All amounts are in dollars in-
flation adjusted to 2001. † difference between low and high compensatory awards is signifi-
cant at p < 0.10; ∗ significant at p < 0.001.
Sources: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [2004], [1996], [1995].
right-most columns assess the mean and standard deviation in the untransfomed
units used in the descriptive statistics in Table 1 of our JELS article and relied on
in Exxon Shipping. Those columns show that both the mean and standard deviation
of the punitive–compensatory ratio strikingly and statistically significantly differ
for low award and high award cases. Lumping the two groups of cases together
to make policy or doctrine based on a single mean or a single standard deviation
is therefore statistically questionable. In the untransformed units, one can firmly
reject the hypotheses of equal mean ratios and of equal standard deviations. Yet the
Court’s use of a single mean and single standard deviation in Exxon Shipping did not
distinguish between low compensatory award and high compensatory award cases.
Table 4 further suggests that, using log-transformed units (the first two numerical
columns), making policy or doctrine based on grouping high and low compensatory
cases together is questionable. The mean ratios in transformed units statistically
significantly differ at p < 0.001. The difference in variances in transformed units is
marginally statistically significantly different (p < 0.10), suggesting caution in com-
bining their standard deviations. In the transformed units, all ratios of 3.55 (34.81 in
untransformed units) or greater are in the low award cases, only 5% of high award
cases have a ratio of 1.90 or greater (6.69 in untransformed units), and only 4% of 384
high award cases have a ratio 3.0 or greater (20 in untransformed units). This pattern
is not suggestive of a systematic pathology in need of constitutional correction.
3.3 The Court Ignored its Own Insight Regarding Low Compensatory Cases and
Placed a Near-Impossible Burden on Establishing the System’s Consistency
The Court’s failure to distinguish between low and high compensatory award cases
is surprising in light of its prior discussion of the topic. The Court has repeat-
edly recognized that the size of the compensatory award can materially affect the
punitive–compensatory ratio. In Exxon Shipping itself, the Court relied on its first
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case to strike down a punitive damages award on constitutional grounds, BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore (517 U.S., p. 559 (1996)). The Court stated, “[L]ow
awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio [...] if, for
example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of eco-
nomic damages” (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2622 (2008), quoting
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S., p. 582 (1996)). In Exxon Shipping,
the Court reiterated the same thought: “heavier punitive awards have been thought
to be justifiable when [...] the value of injury and the corresponding compensatory
award are small” (p. 2622).
When the Court focused on our data about the punitive–compensatory ratio, it
overlooked its own position with respect to low compensatory award cases. As shown
above, the Court suggested in both BMW and Exxon Shipping that low compensatory
cases “may properly support a higher [punitive–compensatory] ratio.” If that is so,
then focusing on a single mean or standard deviation to evaluate the punitive–
compensatory ratio is not statistically supportable. One must take into account the
size of the compensatory award.
Yet the Court did not investigate whether the mean and standard deviation of
concern were the product of precisely the factors it had approved as supporting high
ratios. Had the Court examined the graphs in our article, reproduced as Figures 1
and 2 above, it might have avoided questionable reliance on the summary statistics
in Table 1 that do not differentiate between low compensatory award cases and
other cases. In this sense, the Court’s methodology led it astray in the same way that
others have been led astray by failing to first graph data.
The Court’s overlooking of evidence supporting its own sound intuition about
high ratios in low compensatory award cases may have inadvertently led it to place
an unrealistic burden on establishing the consistency of punitive damages awards.
To its credit, the Court seemed to sincerely want evidence on which to base punitive
damages doctrine. It believed it had evidence of an inconsistent pattern of awards
based on our report of the mean and standard deviation in jury trials. In light of
this evidence, to help justify its claim of unpredictability, the Court stated, “We are
aware of no scholarly work pointing to consistency across punitive awards in cases
involving similar claims and circumstances” (p. 2626).
That statement is only defensible if the Court relied on the high mean and standard
deviation to trump the evidence of consistency across the BJS data and many other
studies. With those studies in effect discarded via the Court’s use of the descriptive
statistics, little evidence was left. Had the studies been given fuller consideration or
perhaps been better understood, the Court could not have helped but be aware of
“scholarly work pointing to consistency.” The Court’s own constitutional punitive
damages doctrine recognizes the compensatory award as the key quantitative factor
about a case. The compensatory award, standing alone, is a circumstance so im-
portant that its relation to the punitive award can require a constitutional limitation.
Scholarly work for more than a decade, with data spanning over 30 years, decidedly
does point to consistency across punitive awards in cases involving that similar
circumstance (VIDMAR et al. [2006]).
Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, and Martin T. Wells22 JITE 166
And scholarly work further shows that the compensatory award is the key cir-
cumstance among the claims and circumstances. Work that explores the punitive–
compensatory relation using several sets of variables, including case categories,
plaintiff and defendant status, and locale demonstrate that the compensatory award
is virtually all that matters (EISENBERG et al. [1997, pp. 647f.]). Juries are con-
sistently tailoring the punishment to the harm. To the extent reasonably feasible
given the scarcity of punitive awards and the difficulty of obtaining full information
about each case, scholarly work points to startling consistency in the punitive award
pattern.
Had the Court not gone statistically astray, it seems more in keeping with the
pattern of scholarly work for the Court to have demanded at least some statistical
evidence of inconsistency. The Court might have more justifiably stated, “We are
aware of no credible scholarly work pointing to inconsistency across punitive awards
in cases involving similar claims and circumstances.” The Court likely believed no
further evidence was necessary to supplement the high mean and standard deviation
based on our article. If that is the evidence of inconsistency the Court had in mind, we
believe we have shown that the doctrinal conclusions based on it are not statistically
defensible.
3.4 Application of the Analysis to Exxon Shipping
The above analysis suggests that inconsistency between the Court’s chastisement
of those who have criticized punitive damages as being out of control and the
Court’s simultaneous assertion that punitive damages have been unpredictable can
be explained by insufficient attention to the data and the available analysis of it.
But the fact remains that the Court applied its unpredictability concern to reduce
the punitive award in Exxon Shipping from $2.5 billion to $500 million in order to
achieve a 1:1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. Both an irony and
an underlying consistency attend the Court’s use of the JELS article data to reduce
the award.
The irony is that the Court used the asserted unpredictability of punitive–compen-
satory ratios, which is shown above to be attributable to low compensatory award
cases, to strike an award in a case with a very high compensatory award. The
variance in the punitive–compensatory ratio in cases with compensatory awards of
less than $10,000 was used to strike an award in a $500 million compensatory case.
Yet no evidence exists that high compensatory award cases exhibit the variability of
low award cases that concerned the Court.
Nevertheless, Table 3 above suggests that the Court’s result in Exxon Shipping in
fact may have marginally promoted consistency in the award of punitive damages.
Table 3 suggests that the mean punitive–compensatory ratio is a decreasing function
of the size of the compensatory award size. This is consistent with a lower multiple
being needed to punish or deter as the compensatory award increases (EISENBERG,
HANS, AND WELLS [2008]). This pattern begins with the lowest compensatory
award cases, those less with awards of less than $1,000, and applies to all groups
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of compensatory award cases except the largest category (compensatory award of
$100 million or more) in which there was only one case. For cases with compensatory
awards of $10,000 or more, the mean punitive–compensatory ratio consistently
decreases as the compensatory award increases, and never exceeds one. By reducing
the punitive–compensatory ratio in Exxon Shipping from five to one, the Court thus
brought the ratio much closer to the mean ratio in large cases.
Whether the Court should have done so on the facts of the case may largely
be a function of a factor the Court did not discuss in Exxon Shipping, the wealth
of the defendant. The defendant’s wealth is widely entitled to consideration in
setting punitive damages17 and evidence about the defendants’ financial condition
was presented to the jury in Phase III of the trial (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
128 S.Ct., p. 2614 (2008)). The Court expressed no disapproval of that aspect of
the case but the Court has not provided definitive guidance on what role wealth
may play in punitive award calculations.18 The absence of discussion of wealth in
Exxon Shipping is a bit curious in light of the Court’s express discussion of other
factors that might support an increased punitive–compensatory ratio (p. 2633). And
Exxon’s financial condition would have seemed to merit some discussion. Exxon
Corporation posted profits in excess of $6 billion (excluding Valdez spill expenses)
for 1990 (HOLUSHA [1991]). The financial drain on Exxon of the punitive damages
approved by the Supreme Court was thus little more than the effect of normal
fluctuation in the price of oil. Given that financial information was presented to the
jury, the Court may have viewed that factor as having already been accounted for in
its calculus concerning the punitive award but, as noted, no express guidance was
provided (HYLTON [2009]).
4 Conclusion
Although Exxon Shipping suggests a 1:1 ratio as a possible constitutional limit,
the opinion does not embrace that ratio, seemingly based on some sense of the
median ratio, as a limit for all cases. Using the median ratio as a limit for all
cases would dramatically shift the distribution of the punitive–compensatory ratio
by effectively eliminating the top half of the distribution. The Court apparently
does not endorse such a profound shift because the opinion does not rule out
accounting for key covariates such as the size of the compensatory award and the
degree of misbehavior. The Court’s opinions have been careful to leave open room
17 E.g., Southern Union Co. v. Irvin, 563 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 2009) (Rein-
hardt, J., concurring); MARKEL [2009, p. 332 n. 318]; Florida Standard Jury Instruc-
tions (Civil), § 2.d.2; New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 2008, § 2:278; A.L.R.
[1991]. States may allow punitive damages without defendant wealth evidence. Vance
v. 46 and 2, Inc., 920 A.2d 202 (Pa. Super. 2007).
18 Pacific Mutual Life Ins.e Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S., 1, 22 (1991) (Alabama’s stan-
dard for reviewing punitive damages, which included the defendant’s financial status,
was “a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama
factfinders”).
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for substantial punitive–compensatory ratios when circumstances warrant them. In
Exxon Shipping, the Court stated that a ratio in the 1:1 range should be the norm
“in cases with no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the punishable
spectrum” (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct., p. 2633 (2008)). The Court
distinguished between cases like Exxon Shipping, “without intentional or malicious
conduct, and without behavior driven primarily by desire for gain,” (p. 2633), from
more egregious cases. Presumably, based on its qualitative statements, the Court also
considers higher punitive–compensatory ratios supportable in cases, unlike Exxon
Shipping, with low compensatory awards. And the Court’s dismissal of Williams
v. Philip Morris USA Inc.19 left in place a punitive award of $79.5 million that far
exceeded the compensatory award in the case.20
On its facts, the Court’s reduction of the punitive award in Exxon Shipping
does little to reshape the landscape of punitive–compensatory ratios. A 1:1 ratio
in such a large case is in keeping with the historic pattern of punitive awards. The
Court’s recognition that other factors could lead to increased ratios and its express
endorsement of higher ratios in low compensatory award cases may mean that the
case represents little in the way of actual change in punitive damages doctrine.
Although portions of the opinion seemingly tug in contradictory directions, that
tension can be reconciled by accepting Exxon Shipping as being tied to very high
compensatory award cases, honoring the language endorsing departures from 1:1
ratios, and cabining the concern about unpredictability through improved statistical
analysis.
The danger is that the Court’s statements will be unthinkingly applied to com-
pensatory award cases notably smaller than Exxon Shipping and contribute to an
inability to tailor punitive awards to the facts and circumstances of particular cases.
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